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FORUM

YIELD W A G E M E N T
Carlos Alberto Castro Peiia

HISTORY
Historically, airlines have ope&ted in a tightly regulated environment. This environment has been regulated
by governments and self-regulated through organizations such as the International Air Transport Association
(KTA)
The early airliie policy for the fare activities was based on offering all the seats on the airplane (or in the
coach of the airplane) at the same rate. When the industry entered the 1960s with bigger and faster planes, new
types of fares were being approved by the Civil AeronauticalBoard (CAB) on certain routes, including lower-night
coach fares, and tour-basing fares. There were no capacity controls on these fares. All of the seats were up for
grabs and were sold on a first come, first-served basis, provided only that the conditions of the fares were met.
By the end ofthe sixties, airliies were looking at day-of-week load factor patterns and introduced midweek
and weekend fare dierentials to stimulate new demand for low load factor flights. High-season and Low-season
differential fares were also in place.
At the same time as these new fares were being implemented, the move toward deregulation of the
economic aspects of the airline industry was gaining speed. By the mid 1970s the carriers were aware that
deregulation was going to happen. Intra state carriers like Southwest Airlines in Texas and Pacific Southwest in
California, which were not subject to federal fare regulations, were filling up their planes with a low-cost, low-fare
product and making money doing it. This caught the attention of consumers, legislators and regulators alike.
DEREGULATION
A revolution in the airline industry occurred with
airline deregulation. Deregulation began a series of events
that changed forever the U.S. domesticairline industry and
increasingly affects the airline industry worldwide. During
the evaluation of this new law or Deregulation as is known,
there was a good deal of controversy, Howard W. Cannon,
who was a United States Senator, and Alfied E. Kahn
fonner Chairman ofthe CAB, had strong opinions in fhvor
of Deregulation. Important elements of their testimony are
expressed below:
1. The need for competition in the market~lace.The
three forces of supply and demand in the market
could do a better job of allocating resources than
a central authority. Artificial barriers to exit and
entry fiom the market would be eliminated,
encouraging new firms to compete and fixes to be
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established on a competitive basis. Inefficiency
would not be rewarded with higher k e s to cover
marginal routes. Instead, carriers could drop
unprofitable routes.
2.
Commuter
carriers could best serve low-density
markets. Smaller carriers with appropriate
equipment could better serve low-density traffic
points than lager carriers, which received either a
subsidy or higher h e s to cover the costs of
serving such points.
Among the persons against of the Deregulation
were George McGovern, former United States Senator and
Albert V. Casey, former President of American Airlines,
Inc. The following are important aspects oftheir testimony:
1. Regulation has served the vublic interest as well
as the interests of the carriers. Regulation has
checked the forces that might create extreme
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competition on the one hand or monopoly on the
other. Evidence of success is the fact that the rise
in passenger fixes over the years has been lower
than the rise in the Consumer Price Index.
2. Unbridled com~etition would result in only
ternDorarv allocative efficiency. Carriers would
undercut each other's Ewes with the eventual
result that only the larger companies would
survive (survival of the fittest). Fares would then
rise when few competitors remained in the
I
market.
3.
Smaller
communities
might lose service.
Commuter carriers might not be willing or able to
serve some markets. Furthermore, the community
might not accept them once the established carrier
dropped service.
When Deregulation did happen it changed the industry in
important ways:
1. ' Route entry. On January 1, 1982, the CAB lost
virtually all of its control over entry into the air
transportation business or entry by carriers intro
new markets. Under the new law, a certificate is
still required, but it has generally been fieely
given, regardless of the statutory fitness standard.
However, despite the i c t that carriers have picked
up a number of formerly dormant and other new
certificates in the past five years, very few ofthese
certificates have been utilized. The economic
recession in the early 1980s unquestionably, was
a major fbctor.
2. Route exit. The revised law allows the air carriers
much greater flexibility in dropping markets than
1958 act. Which mandated and extensive CAB
approval process. Under the revised law, a carrier
has only to give the CAB 9O-days' notice of its
intention toexit a particular community. However,
during a 10-year transition period, the CAB (and
the department of transportation after 1985) has
been given the power to require the last carrier
serving a community to maintain what is called
"essential air service" until a suitablereplacement
carrier can be found. Congress also guaranteed
subsidy to provide service to such communities if
needed.
3. Rates and Fares. As of January 1,1983, the CAB
effectively lost all of its authority over airline
passenger fires (it already had lost most of its
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power over air fieight rates by that date) Although
the carriers still maintain a private system of
passenger and air fieight taris, the old system of
tariff filling and the lengthy approval processhave
been abolish.
4. Federal ~reem~tion.
Until the 1978act, there were
no federal statutes preempting state economic
regulation of air transportation. The new law
provides that no state or political subdivision and
no interstate agency may enact or enforce any law
or regulation concerning rates, routes or services
of any carrier to provide interstate air
transportation. The intent here was to preclude the
possibility of having 50 CABS.
One ofthe most tangible results ofthis revolution
was an explosion in the number of fixes offered in the
marketplace. Fare aspect was a very critical area for airline
growth, and the lack of technology had a direct effect on
W e policy. For instance, fires were published in books
which reservations agents used to identi5 the appropriate
Wes for a given markets. Because the pricing of an
itinerary was manual, rules and hres had to be relatively
simple. Also, because the books had to be printed and
distributed, fixes could not change very often. With the
advent of Computer Reservation System (CRS) and its
cousins the Global Distribution System (GDS) tariff books
became a thing of the past and prices could change very
rapidly.
In this time of period (1970s), the demand for
more discount fire products increased dramatically. The
Civil Aeronautical Board responded by easing regulations
for charter airlines, and opening the way for several new
types of charter products. However, discount k e s for
scheduled airlines were still highly restricted and limited to
certain markets. The charter airlines began to offer what
were called "public charters" that would enable them to sell
seats on what amounted to quasi-scheduled service.
The threat of the public charter was a matter of
great concern for all scheduled airlines. When the airlines
reached the point where they could no longer reduce costs,
they returned to the search for better technology. However,
no airline was completelyprepared for the scope of changes
caused by deregulation to the pricing environment.
The airlines developed new procedures and
technology in order to be the largest carrier. Many wanted
to become not only a national carriers, but an international
one as well. Each wanted to be the airline of the business
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traveler. Everyone tried to out-do the other to attract this
customer, including fkequent flier programs, special
privileges for high-mileage travelers and new aircraft. The
new aircraft were a critical part of this growth. Customers
clearly preferred new to old, or so management hoped. One
ofthe most worried airlines in this new environment was
American. Years later, American CEO, Bob Crandall, who
was the Senior Vice-president-Marketing fbr the airline,
explained the mood "This was driving us crazy. They were
going to fly from New York to California for some amount
of money that was a hell of a lot less than we had to
charge." He was talking, ofcourse, about the bublic charter.
American had to find a way to compete but they could not
possibly produce seats as cheaply as the charter airlines, or
so they initially thought.
Their planes were currently flying, on average,
half-empty. They were already producing seats cheaper
than the charter operators could hope to produce. "If we
could figure out a way to sell those empty seats at the prices
the charter guys proposed," thought Crandall, 'We would
make a lot of dough." However, there were huge problems
to be overcome. Those were preventing the people who
would pay the higher lire fkom switching to the lower fares
and ensuring that only those seats that would otherwise fly
empty were sold at the lowest fare level. This was the
beginning of modern day Revenue Management.
American's Solution was called "Super Saver
Fares," which were capacity-controlled, restricted discount
fares. It was introduced to the market on April 25, 1977.
This methodology was highly successful. The challenge
was just beginning for them as they realized how carefidly
the availability of the Super Saver seats needed to be
controlled in order to maintain profitability.
They started the new system with basic allocations
of about 30% of the seats on each flight assigned to Super
Saver discount fares, and also to complement the system
they implemented new strategies, such as advance
purchase. Discount seatsrequired 2 1-day advancepurchase.
If they did not allocate enough seats lir enough in advance,
the planes would depart with empty seats.
Before long, however, American's executives
recognized the hct that each flight behaves difFkrently by
time of day and day of week. Therefore, they began to study
the behavioral characteristics of each flight, on each day of
the week. In addition large computer systems were
developed to forecast and monitor passenger demand. The
objective was to sell the right seat to the right passenger for
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the right price at the right time.
The inventory seat method became a system,and
it was Bob Crandall who is credited for giving this, the
initial inventory management process a formal name. He
thought, the term, 'veld" was commonly used to measure
revenue per passenger mile, so, recognizing that the seat
allocations aflkted the passenger yield, Crandall decided
to call it "Yield Management".
YIELD MANAGEMENT
Despite widespread allegations that deregulation
resulted in billions of dollars in consumer saving, the truth
is that prices were fklling Wer before deregulation than
after it. Inflation-adjusted yields declined 2.5% annually
fkom 1950to 1978; they fell only 1.7% a year after 1978. In
the decade preceding 1978, fuel adjusted real yields fell
2.7% annually; in the decade followingpromulgation ofthe
Airline Deregulation Act of that year, fuel adjusted yields
declined only 1.9% a year.
In addition, the full fare has risen to such
prohibitive levels that only those who absolutely must will
pay it (only 10% of passenger do).
It is for all these reasons the airlines sought the
best way to optimize their profits, developing different
methods, and strategies that would allow the companies to
maximize revenues. The best option created was the Yield
Management. Its philosophy was used by different
companies under different names, as is every new
technology, or process, but it showed itself to be most
effective. It brought the stability needed for the airlines to
continue in the aviation business, and to fend off the
innovative charter carriers.
Yield Management or Revenue Management as is
also known, can be defined as the process of selectively
accepting or rejecting reservations requests to maximize
revenues. The basic premise behind airline yield
management is relatively simple: make seats that are
expected to go unsold available at a lower fare to the
passenger who would otherwise not travel, while at the
same time ensuring that these lower fares are not purchased
by passengers who are willing and able to pay a higher fare.
The optimal mix of short-haul and long-haul passenger in
an airlineroute network is obtained by selling the right seat
to the right customer, at the right price, at the right time to
maximize system revenues and profitability. This goal is
accomplished by setting reservation availability based on
the value of the reservation request.
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The success ofRevenue Managementin the airline
h e wars of the early 1980's was the validation of an
important new management technique. In 1987, The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology awarded a Doctor of
Philosophy degree Peter Belobaba for his description of the
airline f k e optimization issue and the development of the
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model. This was
the first widely applied optimization method for controlling
the number of discount seats airlines offer.
EfiFective airlineyield management msists of two
distinct components (Belobaba 1987a) as follows:
Differential pricing: this is the practice of
offering a variety of k e products differentiated
in terms of service amenities and /or travel
restrictions, at a variety of price levels.
Seat Inventory control: this is the practice of
determiningthe number of seats on a flight to be
made available for sale to a particular h e
product, limiting low-he seats and protecting
seats for later-booking, by higher-fsre
passengers, as necessary.
The principal tool used by the airlines for
developing Yield Management has been the effective and
consistent use of technology. The level of technology is a
very important aspect to develop in order to achieve the
goals of the system and of course of the company because
the level of technology dictates the sophistication of the
Yield Management process to generate incremental
revenues. It is the reason that many carriers have been
gaining revenue advantages (as opposed to cost
advantages). This fgct has historically been thejustification
for carriers to spend millions of dollars developing, even
more sophisticated yield management systems.
Yield management systems are extremely
complicated to set up and maintain. They require complex
hardware and software. They demand a constant stream of
data. Prices under these systems are set and reset
fiequently, often many times each day.
Collecting reservations holding data periodically
fiom a reservations system is a relatively straightforward
process, since data are already stored at this level of detail.
From the demand fmecast generated, leg-or segment-based
inventory controls are then computed and updated on the
airline's host Computer Reservations System (CRS).
Indeed the firstphase in the evolution ofthe Yield
Management was the developing of the relatively basic
simple database management systems designed to collect
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and store historical flight booking data. Periodic (usually
nightly) extracts or "snapshots" of the current inventory
and booking levels in the airline's reservation system are
downloaded and stored in a historical booking database.
The secondgeneration YieldManagemat systems
compare historical booking patterns were generated from
the database with actual bookings on future flights, and
they issue "exception reports" to the analyst, listing only
those future departures that meet a predetermined set of
criteria.
The kct is that CRS is one of three key reasons,
which have precipitated the growth of the airline industry
fiom a predominantly regional industry to a national and
international industry dominated by mega carriers. The
other two keys are internal yield management automation,
which is clearly represented in the third phase in the
evolution of Yield Management systems. It involved the
incorporation of mathematical models for forecasting,
optimization, and over booking. The third key reason is the
developing of the extensive hub system now in place.
OBJECTIVES
What is the purpose of the Revenue Management?
How does it work? How should an inventory analyst
determine discount seat allocation?
The purpose ofthe Revenue Management or Yield
Management is to maximize the revenue of the airlines.
Another goal ofthismethodology is to reduce the consumer
surplus. The consumer surplus is defined as the benefit that
a consumer obtains when he or she can get a service or
product with a lower price considering that the consumer
would otherwise pay a higher price. The yield management
also pennits the airlines to established their prices
strategies and respond quickly to changes in prices of their
competitors. Additionally, Yield Management tries to
manage the supply/demand relationship for a market
controlling the capacity or output and its price. This
methodology has been very important for the airlines after
deregulation because the price and frequency are the
principals indicators for the consumers.
The Revenue Management works as follow. The
airlines recollect historical data of the number of
passengers that have traveled and how much they paid in
each class. With this information, the airline estimates the
demand fiinction for every class. The demand estimation is
very critical because it permits the airline to know the
elasticity or sensitivity of the consumer to the change in
prices. The demand function also permits built the
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probability that one passenger or group of passenger get
this h e . With this information the airline knows how
people respond to its prices and the expected number of
passengers. After that the airline establishes the capacity
and the prices and compares the estimated booking with the
real one. When the kre classes are not 111and the flight is
approaching to the departing, the analyststake the decision
about if they have to open a new class or give a bigger
discount. This is in a very basic idea of how Yield
management works. Some new concepts have been
developed such as Virtual nesting. This tecpique permits
the airlines to manage the revenue for a flight that goes
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through a network instead of analyzing just one leg or
market.
For a better understanding of the Yield
Management an example is shown fiom Northwest airlines.
How can the analyst determine the number of
discount seat allocations? Let us, supposethat we have the
distribution frequency for the Class Y, Class B and C of
certain flight in certain market. The Class Y is the 111k r e
and B and C are discount classes and are nested. It means
that the total number of seats equals to Y. The information
is presented in the next table.
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Table 1 Expected Marginal Seat Revenue
Class Y
Fare
Av. #
PAX
SD

Pax
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

200

Class Y
Fare
Av. #
PAX
SD

15
7
ACC.
Expected Marginal
Probability Seat Revenue Pax
97.7
'
195.4500
1
193.6700
2
96.80%
95.70%
191.3500
3
94.20%
188.3900
4
184.6900
5
92.30%
90.1 0%
180.1500
6
87.30%
174.6900
7
84.10%
168.2700
8
80.40%
160.8600
9
76.20%
152.4900
10
7 1.60%
143.2300
11
66.60%
133.1800
12
122.4900
13
61.20%
1 1 1.3600
14
55.70%
50.00%
100.0000
15
44.30%
16
88.6400
17
38.80%
77.5 100
18
66.8200
33.40%
28.40%
19
56.7700
23.80%
47.5 100
20
19.60%
39.1400
21
15.90%
3 1.7300
22
12.70%
25.3100
23
9.90%
19.8500
24
7.70%
15.3100
25
5.80%
11.6100
26
4.30%
8.6500
27
3.20%
6.3300
28
4.5500
29
2.30%
1.60%
3.2100
30
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120
20
4

Class Y
Fare
Av. # PAX
SD

100
35
15

Acc.
Expected Marginal
Probability Seat Revenue
100.00%
1 19.9998
100.00%
1 19.9995
1 19.9987
100.00%
100.00%
1 19.9961
100.00%
1 19.9893
100.00%
1 19.9720
99.90%
1 19.9307
1 19.8380
99.90%
1 19.6424
99.70%
99.40%
119.2548
98.80%
1 18.5330
1 17.2699
97.70%
115.1929
96.00%
93.30%
11 1.9831
89.40%
107.3220
84.10%
100.9613
77.30%
92.8047
8219754
69.10%
59.90%
71.8447
50.00%
60.0000
40.10%
48.1552
30.90%
37.0245
22.70%
27.1952
15.90%
19.0386
10.60%
12.6779
6.70%
8.0 168
4.00%
4.8070
2.30%
2.7300
1.20%
1.4669
0.60%
0.745 1
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The total of Passenger in class Y is 30. Now the question is
the following: using the information in the table how many
seats of Y, B and C do we have to allocate? The answer is
psy, if we have the demand estimation module that gives
us the distribution of the number of people per type of fim.
In this case, we h o w that on average 15people fly in class
Y. Using the concept of Expected Marginal Seat Revenue
(EMSR: multiply the cumulative probability for the
passenger X by the fhre level) we can estimate how many
seats of Y we have to sell. In this case is 13'because this is
the point where the EMSR is equal to our next fire level in
this case is 120. The same logic can be applied to the class
B. The next class, fare C, is 100 so we have to sell 16 seats
of B and then we can follow the same procedure time after
time. In conclusion, we have to sell:
13 seats of Y class @ 200 dollars
16 seats of B class @ 120 dollars
1 seat of Class C @ 100 dollars
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Total expected revenue: $4.260
It is the work developed by the Yield
Management analyst, who studying every market
movement and collecting daily information to maintain
their database completely update, and producing the
more responsible and reliable decision for the company.
Yield or Revenue Management is a procedure
that looks for maximizing the demand curve in order to
obtain the most revenue for the company.
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Figure 1 Demand Curve
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The revenue is obtained applying a basic
mathematical operation, which is based on calculating the
area below the curve. In this case, it is that of a geometric
figure, a rectangle, and its area represents the calculated by
the formula of multiplying base by height.
The initial thought could be to sell all the seats at
the highest price, but just a limited quantity of people
would be willing and able to pay this fare, and therefore
this farewill generate less revenue than selling some seats
at reduced cost However, as it is shows on this graphic the
highest quantity of persons willing and able fo pay for the
seat are found at the lowest price, as the demand laws
establish "the demand of a product rises as its prices Mls*.
However, low prices could result in a losses for the airline
due to this price will generate a lower revenue than the
revenue expected selling part of the seats at the highest
price.
The most convenientsolution for this flight will be
sell the seats at thk price B where the more highest quantity
of people will be willing and able to pay the fare for the
seats. This strategy can also insure that the total revenue for
the flight will be the highest.
CONCLUSION
Deregulation has tended to generate a greater
number of alternative fares and to increase both fare and
schedule volatility. In a volatility environment, airlines
have to decide quickly which of their competitor's actions
need to be matched and which are of little consequence. An
airline also has greater opportunity in such environments
to take a proactive approachtowards its own pricing tactics.
Yield Management has been one of the most
important tools used by the airlines for maintaining the
stability of its business. Claims have been made that a
good, basic yield management system can boost revenuesby
up to ten percent. It can also impose management
discipline. Traffic is tangible and clearly visible at
departuretime whereas, in the absence of a YMS, revenues
and yields are known only days or weeks later and profits
come to light even firther into the future. Yield statistics

might not be disaggregated on a segment-by-segment or
route-by-route basis. Airlines could not know their behavior
on specific market or route. Thus, they could not establish
or even change their marketing strategies. The benefits of
Yield Management are clear.
Finally, the utility of Yield Management is not
limited to getting a few incremental bottoms onto otherwise
empty seats. It can form the technological basis
underpinning much wider limited-period promotions,
combining the advantages of both filling off-peak capacity
and raising or reinforcing and airlines market profile.
Yield Manangement are vital in a competitive
market, particularly when the competition has such a
system deployed. Nonetheless, it also need to be treated
with caution, for the following reasons.
Yield Management models are simply tools which
airlines can use to help them slideup and down the demand
curves for individual products. These can control the speed
and extent of the slide. What they cannot do is create
demand which is profitable in the long run if people are
unwilling to pay the prices to ensureprofitability, given the
nature ofthe products offbred and a particular airline's cost
structure. In addition, YMS cannot create demand for a
specific market. There are many cases related with airlines
which did not develop the system in the best way, such as
was the case of the big white and blue American airline
"Pan Am*.Pan Am flew empty airplanes to places such as,
Pago Pago, Rabat, Monrovia, Lagos. "In 1968, Pan Am
announced that it would o& nonstop 707 service to
MosaW? In the Soviet Union? Who in 1968, other than the
odd tourist and few spies, would pay to travel to Moscow?"
Why, just ' k u s e we are Pan h,
and we supposed to fly
exotic places". In the specific case of Pan Am, we can find
in the books Skygods, comments such as "We built this
airline," or fiom the services director who said "The Pan
Am culture was in our blood." Pan Am as well as other
airlines showed that it and other companies were not
prepared to cope with the challenge of a fiee market caused
by Deregulation.0
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